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This paper reviews the concept of presence in immersive virtual envi-
ronments, the sense of being there signalled by people acting and responding 
realistically to virtual situations and events. We argue that presence is a 
unique phenomenon that must be distinguished from the degree of engage-
ment, involvement in the portrayed environment. We argue that there are three 
necessary conditions for presence: the (a) consistent low latency sensorimotor 
loop between sensory data and proprioception; (b) statistical plausibility: im-
ages must be statistically plausible in relation to the probability distribution of 
images over natural scenes. A constraint on this plausibility is the level of im-
mersion; (c) behaviour-response correlations: Presence may be enhanced and 
maintained over time by appropriate correlations between the state and be-
haviour of participants and responses within the environment, correlations 
that show appropriate responses to the activity of the participants. We con-
clude with a discussion of methods for assessing whether presence occurs, and 
in particular recommend the approach of comparison with ground truth and 
give some examples of this. 
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Como experimentamos los entornos virtuales inmersivos: 
el concepto de presencia y su medición 
 
En este artículo se revisa el concepto de presencia en entornos virtua-
les inmersivos; es decir, la sensación de estar dentro del entorno virtual indi-
cada por el modo de responder al mismo como si fuera real. La presencia de-
be distinguirse de otros fenómenos como el compromiso o la implicación. Hay 
tres condiciones necesarias para la presencia. La primera es un bucle senso-
motor consistente y de baja latencia entre los datos sensoriales y propiocepti-
vos. La segunda es la plausibilidad estadística, referente a que las imágenes 
deben ser estadísticamente plausibles en relación con la distribución de pro-
babilidad de las imágenes en escenas naturales. Un límite para esta condición 
viene dado por el nivel de inmersión. La tercera es la correlación entre el 
comportamiento del sujeto y la respuesta del entorno. La presencia se mantie-
ne e incrementa a lo largo del tiempo como consecuencia de la correlación 
entre, por un lado, el estado y el comportamiento del sujeto y, por otro, las 
respuestas del entorno, indicando que el entorno responde de forma adecuada 
a la actividad del sujeto. Se concluye con una discusión de los métodos que se 
pueden emplear para evaluar la presencia y se recomienda para ello, en par-
ticular, la comparación con datos obtenidos sobre el terreno; es decir, la 
comparación entre las respuestas del sujeto ante estímulos virtuales y las res-
puestas ante los correspondientes estímulos reales. 
Palabras clave: presencia, entornos virtuales inmersivos. 
 
 In this paper “presence” is considered as the propensity of people to respond 
to virtually generated sensory data as if they were real (Sanchez-Vives & Slater, 
2005). This encompasses their ability to act within the environment created by 
virtually generated sense data in a manner commensurate with how they 
would be able to behave if the sensory data were real. If they see an object on 
the floor below them, and wish to lift it, then they should be able to bend 
down, grab it, feel it, feel its weight, and lift it, see their limbs (or representa-
tions of these) in the act of lifting, with proprioception matched to sensory 
data. High presence does not demand high fidelity to physical reality, but 
rather that people do respond, and be able to respond, as if the sensory data 
were physically real. This approach makes “presence” directly observable and 
measurable –both with respect to observations of others, and with respect to 
knowledge of one’s own behaviour–.  
 The vast majority of research on presence has represented the concept as 
a subjective state or feeling, including the notion of “being there”, that is ac-
cessible and measurable by questionnaires, as discussed for example in Draper 
et al. (1998). Here we present a quite different view, treating presence as 
rooted in activity, the response of people to their surroundings and their ability 
to actively modify those surroundings (Flach Holden, 1998; Zahorik & Jeni-
son, 1998). Another way to state our definition in the opening paragraph is 
that presence arises when there is successful substitution of real sensory data 
by virtually generated sensory data. The substitution is “successful” to the 
extent that the participant in a virtual or mixed reality forms percepts from the 
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sense data and responds to and acts upon these as if they were real. This response 
is at many levels, ranging from unconscious physiological processes such as brain 
activation states, heart activity, breathing, skin response, through unconscious 
automatic behaviours and reflexes, through deliberate volitional behaviour, 
through to the highest level cognitive behaviour - including a ‘feeling of being 
there’. The advantage of this definition is that it is operational, and it applies 
equally well to mixed reality environments as well as pure virtual reality. The 
“sense of being there” is but one small part of this, which in any case only 
applies to a virtual reality and not, for example, to augmented reality. We use 
the term ‘reported presence’ to mean that particular aspect of presence meas-
urement that refers to people’s post-hoc subjective reporting of what they felt 
during the experience. Hence all questionnaires at best capture aspects of ‘re-
ported presence’ rather than presence. 
 It is important to note that this definition automatically includes interac-
tion, and the ability to interact with the environment, especially the ability to 
use one’s whole body in interaction where appropriate (e.g., move by really 
walking). The requirement to ‘respond as if it were real’ naturally involves 
interaction, the ability to pick up objects, move through an environment, avoid 
obstacles, and so on–these are all part of what constitutes the potentiality for a 
response as if the virtual sensory data were real. 
 
 
Presence and Immersion 
 
 The distinction between the terms ‘immersion’ and ‘presence’ has been 
discussed several times before (Draper et al., 1998; Slater, 1999; Slater & 
Wilbur, 1997). We reserve the term immersion to stand simply for what the 
technology delivers from an objective point of view. The more that a system 
delivers displays (in all sensory modalities) and tracking that preserves fidelity 
in relation to their equivalent real-world sensory modalities, the more that it 
may be described as being “immersive”. This is something that can be objec-
tively assessed, based on technical parameters used to describe a system. What 
field of view, what frame rate, what latency, is it stereo, does it have head-
tracking, what haptics is supported, and so on. This is a very different matter 
to the human response to experiencing environments that such systems deliver. 
This distinction is similar to that in colour science. A colour can be described 
objectively in terms of a wavelength distribution. However, the perception and 
emotional response to a colour is an entirely different matter –and includes the 
notion, for example, of metamers, where objectively different wavelength 
distributions are perceived as the same colour by human observers–. So im-
mersion is analogous to “wavelength distribution” –in principle it can be ob-
jectively assessed (though we may not always know how to do this)–. Following 
through the analogy with metamers, different immersion systems may have 
indistinguishable perceptual impacts on people in terms of presence. 
 If immersion is analogous to wavelength distribution in the description of 
colour then “presence” is analogous to the perception of colour. Presence is a 
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human reaction to immersion. Given the same immersive system, different 
people may exhibit different levels of presence, and also different immersive 
systems may give rise to the same level presence in different people. Presence 
and immersion are logically separable, but clearly there is a relationship between 
them that can be discovered empirically. Part of the study of presence is to 
understand this relationship, and there have been many studies that have at-
tempted this, albeit limited in scope to reported presence. 
 It should be clear from this discussion that presence and immersion are 
not the same. Remember that presence is a “response” to a system of a certain 
level of immersion. In order to achieve presence we could follow two different 
paths. The first would be to construct a system that has such a high fidelity to 
reality that it becomes indistinguishable from reality. A more interesting approach 
is to use knowledge of the perceptual system to find out what is important in 
our representations of reality –to deliver presence even when the level of im-
mersion is not high. People may achieve presence with wire frame computer 
graphics, some approximation to auditory fidelity, low resolution, and so on. 
How does this work? This is a real scientific question for presence research. 
Knowing the wavelength distribution of light emitted from a surface informs 
us something about how it may be perceived in terms of colour, but it is far 
from the whole story. Understanding the human perceptual response to the 
wavelength distribution is critical in understanding colour. We know that, for 
example, that it is conceptually possible to reproduce the entire spectrum of 
perceivable colours (taking into account metamers) just by additively combining 
three primaries. This latter property (reducing the function space of wavelength 
distributions to the three dimensional space of perceivable colours) is only 
possible because of the way that human perceptual system works. Similarly, 
our anecdotal experience of virtual reality convinces us that presence can be 
achieved with systems that are extreme in their paucity compared to the infi-
nitely greater detail available in perceptions of real life. We hypothesise that 
just as a complex wavelength distribution can be “simulated” in terms of colour 
perception by an appropriate additive combination of three primary colours, so 
the presence in a real life situation can be simulated by a virtual reality that 
delivers the right combination low fidelity sensory data in relation to physical 
reality. The question then is: what would be the equivalence to the “primary 
colours” in colour perception, the minimal set of elements that when com-
bined give rise to presence in the same way that combinations of primaries can 
give rise to the sensation of colour? 
 
 
Presence and Attention, Emotion, Involvement, Engagement and Others 
 
 There are many other concepts that are confounded with presence, whether 
just confused through use in everyday language or even forming part of offi-
cial questionnaires –for example, «How much did the visual aspects of the 
environment involve you?» (Witmer & Singer, 1998)–. We can separate in-
volvement from presence, it is at a different logical level. One can be present 
 How we experience immersive virtual environments: the concept of presence and its measurement  197 
Anuario de Psicología, vol. 40, nº 2, septiembre 2009, pp. 193-210 
© 2009, Universitat de Barcelona, Facultat de Psicologia 
but not involved (as in many situations in everyday life). One can be involved 
but not present (e.g., watching a soap opera on tv). This does not say that we 
should confuse “involvement” with presence. In physical reality one can study 
how much different situations “involve” people. One can also do the same in 
virtual reality. However, this is not the same as studying presence. Listening 
to some quadrophonically broadcast music you might say «This is just like 
being in the theatre listening to the orchestra –but as for the music itself– it 
just doesn't interest me». This is high presence, low involvement (or interest). 
 Presence is orthogonal to emotional content. In physical reality you can 
be in a situation that results in a pattern of emotional responses. Given a similar 
situation portrayed within a virtual environment, the question to ask is how 
similar is the pattern of emotional responses generated within the VE to that 
which was generated in physical reality? In other words, how much is the re-
sponse to the virtual sensory data as if it were real, on the emotional level. 
This does not imply that highly emotional events are “more presence inducing” 
than events that have little emotional ramifications. The question is the simi-
larity of distribution of emotional responses, whatever the actual emotional 
responses may be. Moreover it is extremely difficult, and perhaps methodologi-
cally impossible, to distinguish between presence and emotion by the use of 
questionnaires. If participants in an experiment are subject to two different 
scenarios, one that is emotionally charged and the other that is emotionally 
neutral, of course they are going to say that the first resulted in more “presence” 
than the second. But here “presence” and “emotion” are deeply confounded. It 
is simply asking the wrong question to consider whether there is a link be-
tween “emotion” and “presence” in a virtual environment (Freeman et al., 
2005c). Emotion, in our view, is part of the response to a virtual environment, 
and the important issue is whether the response conforms to what would be 
expected if the participants were responding to the situation as if it were real.  
 
 
Correlational Presence 
 
 In a review of the concept of presence in virtual environments and associated 
literature (Sanchez-Vives & Slater, 2005) it was reported that experimental 
studies have found that factors that contribute to high reported presence are 
mainly concerned with the form of how data is displayed to participants and 
how they are able to interact, rather than with the level of realism of the dis-
plays. For example, wide field of view, low latency, high frame-rate, surround 
sound, haptic feedback, stereo rather than mono displays, head-tracking all 
seem to contribute to higher reported presence. In addition the ability to interact 
with the environment making use of whole body interaction in a natural way 
appears to favour higher reported presence in comparison with “button-press” 
types of interaction more suited to two-dimensional displays. What does not 
seem to be important is high fidelity visual realism. For example, a person 
giving a talk in an immersive virtual environment to an audience of virtual 
characters who appear to be responding to the talk is likely to react to the be-
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haviour of the virtual characters as if they were real –in spite of the absolute 
knowledge that there is no audience there, and in spite of the low level of real-
ism of the characters (Pertaub et al., 2002). How is this possible?  
 It seems that humans have a propensity to find correlations between their 
activity and internal state and their sense perceptions of what is going on “out 
there”. In studies that involve interactions between real people and virtual 
characters, people impute meaning to entirely contingent events. For example, 
as they look at a virtual character and by chance the character turns its head, 
people will often say something like “Every time I looked at that person she 
looked away” and there are many examples of this type of behaviour. This 
propensity to construct such stories is so strong that it was realised that virtual 
environments may provide an ideal laboratory for the study of paranoid idea-
tion, and several successful experiments have now been conducted in this area 
(Freeman et al., 2008a; Freeman et al., 2005a; Freeman et al., 2005b; Freeman 
et al., 2008b; Freeman et al., 2005c; Valmaggia et al., 2007). This is one aspect 
of what we refer to in this chapter as correlational presence. An important 
aspect of our approach is that presence may be enhanced through statistical 
correlation between activity and sensory feedback at many different levels. A 
simple example is the required correlation between the proprioceptive feeling 
of head turning and the concomitant update in the displays due to low-latency 
head-tracking. In the interaction between people it is such correlational behaviour 
that establishes the reality of the situation – matched changes in posture and 
stance, listeners nodding (or shaking) their heads while someone is talking –a 
kind of unsupervised dance emerges between the participants that links them 
together into a higher order social entity–. In “collaborative virtual reality” 
applications, it is the very absence of such correlational cues that undermines the 
establishment of shared presence (Garau et al., 2005; Slater & Steed, 2000). 
 Correlational presence requires that when people interact their facial ex-
pressions, motor behaviours, and overall aspect including skin colour changes 
correlate with the actions of one another. This needs to occur with overt semi-
volitional behaviour (such as a person nodding when someone talks to them, 
or correlated shifts in posture) (figure 1) through unconscious non-volitional 
behaviour, such as correlations between breathing or heart rate in one person 
with the actions of another person. These are aspects of interpersonal interac-
tion that are barely noticed in everyday life, but have a profound effect when 
they are missing (Slater et al., 2000) (as is always the case to date in interac-
tions between participants or between participants and virtual humans within 
VEs). This principle can be taken further, that not just the behaviours and 
states of representations of people correlate with behaviours of the self, but 
also that this can occur with multiple aspects of the environment. This extends 
the world of mundane reactions that actually do occur in physical reality, tak-
ing advantage of mixed reality to construct environments that adapt to the 
behaviours, moods and states of the individuals within it. Some preliminary 
work in this area is reported in (Gillies & Slater, 2005). 
 How we experience immersive virtual environments: the concept of presence and its measurement  199 
Anuario de Psicología, vol. 40, nº 2, septiembre 2009, pp. 193-210 
© 2009, Universitat de Barcelona, Facultat de Psicologia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A real person interacts with virtual characters Mimicry is one step towards 
 attribution of “mind” 
 
Figure 1: When people interact with virtual characters. Correlations in behaviour between the real 
and virtual people are likely to enhance the probability of the real person responding to the virtual 
people as if they are real. 
 
Correlational Presence and the Statistical Theory of Vision 
 
 The idea of correlational presence is rooted in one of the important currents 
in the neuro-scientific understanding of perception which is the statistical ap-
proach (Lotto, 2002; Lotto & Purves, 2001; Lotto & Purves, 2002; Purves & 
Lotto, 2002; Purves et al., 2000; Purves et al., 2004; Purves et al., 2001). Vi-
sion has no direct access to the visual world other than through the dynamic 
patterns of light that fall on its sensors. But because this sensory information 
conflates multiple attributes of that world, light stimuli are inherently ambigu-
ous with respect to their underlying sources. Furthermore, the sources of stim-
uli are themselves behaviourally indeterminant, as they are not imbued with 
ecological value. As such, what we see is not a representation of the informa-
tion that arises directly from the world (which is inherently ambiguous), or 
indeed a representation of the world that generated it (with which the brain has 
no direct access). Rather, the visual system has evolved to solve this problem 
empirically by basing its visual behaviour on the probability distribution over 
the past behavioural significance of retinal stimuli. We “see” correlations, 
correlations based on our ontogenetic and phylogenetic experience of what 
particular retinal images signified for visual behaviour.  
 This general view is not restricted to vision, since all sensory correlations are 
multi-modal. When participants in an immersive virtual environment place their 
hand inside something that is red, they will often feel some heat, even though of 
course nothing is actually generated by the technology. “Empirically” based per-
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ception results in a packet of correlated responses that form the totality of a percept 
–and hence the brain can automatically predict missing data based on past 
correlations in order to, often literally, “complete the picture”–. This can also 
be at the basis of the observed fact that people can become present in the most 
simple representations of reality –the brain is filling in missing detail, pro-
vided that there is sufficient feedback (in particular based on head-tracking).  
 
 
Correlational Presence and the Sensorimotor Loop 
 
 One subject on noticing the fixed virtual left arm began to move her real 
left arm very rapidly, in a manner indicating panic. Another wrote «I thought 
there was really something wrong with my [left] arm»; ohers talked of their 
virtual bodies being – «a dead weight», «a useless thing», «nothing to do with 
me» (Slater & Usoh, 1994b). 
 
Something awful’s happened —she mouthed, in a ghostly flat voice— I can’t feel my 
body. I feel weird —disembodied (Sacks, 1998). 
 
 When we carried out one of our first ever virtual reality presence experi-
ments in the early 1990s using a head-mounted head-tracked display, people 
were endowed with virtual bodies, because we had originally found that being 
“embodied” within a virtual reality led to a greater reported sense of presence 
compared to looking down and seeing no part of yourself (Slater & Usoh, 
1994a; Slater & Usoh, 1994b). However, because in those days we were un-
able to track more than one arm, the virtual left arm was in a fixed position. 
Although a participant would see their virtual right arm move in more or less 
synchrony with their (tracked) right arm, their virtual left arm was locked in 
place (because there was no tracking data with which to update it). For some 
subjects this was a profoundly shocking experience, as illustrated in the first 
quotation above. In a later experiment we tried the idea of making the virtual 
left arm move in symmetry with the right arm –so that subjects would see their 
virtual left arm moving even though they might not actually be moving their 
real left arm–. Surprisingly we found that some subjects immediately made 
their real left arm movements match what they saw their virtual left arms do-
ing. They needed to maintain a correlation between their motor actions and 
what their visual system was reporting.  
 The quotation from Oliver Sacks illustrates the profound disembodiment 
that occurs when someone loses their proprioception. It was remarkable that 
our subjects in a virtually induced mismatch between their proprioceptive and 
sensory data made very similar statements. We argue that “presence” in physi-
cal reality is only noticeable by its absence, through something that breaks the 
deep correlation between our motor actions and the response that we experience 
–a break in the sensorimotor loop– for example through brain damage due to a 
stroke. A fundamental requirement within a virtual reality is the maintenance 
of this sensorimotor loop: the continued, predictable correlation between pro-
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prioception and sensory data. A head-turn must result in a concomitant and 
predictable and appropriate change in the visual field, a movement of the body 
must result in the expected correlated sensory and sensed physical changes 
that have been learned over a lifetime. This also follows from earlier theoretical 
and experimental work on presence that led to the concept of “body centred in-
teraction”. This expressed the simple idea that a necessary condition for presence 
in an immersive virtual environment is a match between proprioception and 
sensory data: participant actions must be immediately and consistently repre-
sented by changes in the virtual environment. At the simplest level, for example, 
as the head turns so the displayed images should be updated in accordance with 
the changed viewing parameters. The presence literature is rife with situations 
where this does not happen. For example, it has been found that presence is 
not reported when there is low graphics frame rate or high latency. 
 In the statistical theory of vision it is argued that the interaction between 
our sensory apparatus and the world produces multi-modal “images” from 
which it is impossible to reconstruct properties of the world. In this view our 
perceptual system is like a Bayesian decision engine (Purves & Lotto, 2002). 
Given an “image” (a totality formed from visual, auditory, haptic, olfactory, 
vestibular, proprioceptive... data) the brain essentially selects its “meaning” 
and behavioural response according to its statistical correlation with the set of 
images of natural scenes from the past and their associated behavioural sig-
nificance. Now when aspects of our sensory data are being generated by a 
virtual reality, of course the perceptual system operates in exactly the same 
way. So the meaning of an “image” is interpreted according to its statistical 
correlation with other images, and the appropriate response selected according 
to the past behavioural significance of similar images. For example, if the 
changing patterns of light that fall on the eye as the head is moved around 
form images that are statistically similar to patterns that had occurred in the 
past that were interpreted as looking over a precipice, then behavioural responses 
will be generated appropriate to that situation –even though at the cognitive 
level the participant knows for sure that there is no precipice there. In the past 
the evoked response may have always been one of anxiety in relation to such 
images, and even in a virtual reality this same response may be evoked.  
 Of course in a virtual reality the “patterns of light” corresponding to a 
precipice must be correlated with images from past natural scenes at a relatively 
lower level of correlation than for images corresponding to real scenes. Per-
haps this leads to a lesser evoked response. However, there is also likely to be 
a high degree of within-image correlation –that bundles of features go to-
gether, and not just within one sensory modality but across all modalities (as a 
trivial example, visual images that depict a large object striking the ground are 
likely to correlated with auditory “images” of a loud sound). Hence the brain 
may fill-in missing sensory data (statistically this is equivalent to using corre-
lation for prediction, as in regression analysis). 
 A statistical analogy is to consider k variables x1, x2,…,xk and the multiple 
regression of each xj on the remaining x1, x2,…,xj-1, xj+1,,…,xk based on a large 
set of past data. Each such analysis will produce a corresponding multiple 
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correlation coefficient R2(j). Now suppose (a) that for a particular j, R2(j) is 
close to 1, but when we observe a new set of values for each variable, | xj- zj| is 
large, where zj is the value predicted from the regression equation. Such a re-
sult would be an anomaly. Suppose (b) that we had the observations for each 
variable except for xj, then we could use the regression equation to predict the 
likely value of xj (“filling-in”). Finally (c) if the value of R2(j) was close to 
zero, with low statistical significance, then we could tolerate a large range of 
values of xj irrespective of the values of the other variables.  
 If we think now of the observed vector x = (x1, x2,…,xk) as representing a 
multi-sensory image from a natural scene, then the response associated with x will 
depend on its correlation with previous examples and their associated behavioural 
significance. If x corresponds to a virtual reality where at least some of the xj 
are virtually generated sensory data we could argue that a necessary condition 
for presence is when x correlates sufficiently with past image data from natu-
ral scenes and therefore a response is evoked that is similar to the response to 
those natural scenes –in other words, the response to the virtual data is as if it 
were real. Hence x must be statistically plausible in the context of the probabil-
ity distribution of images over natural scenes.  
 In view of (c) above, this does not require virtual images that are high 
fidelity with respect to images of natural scenes –since a very high degree of 
tolerance may be accepted–. Anyone who has experienced immersive virtual 
reality knows personally that high presence may be induced even though the 
visual quality of the rendered scenes are poor in relation to real scenes. Also 
the evidence from experiments suggests that this is the case. In Usoh et al. (2000) 
subjects who experienced a poor virtual reality simulation of a laboratory did 
not report lower presence than another group who experienced the real labora-
tory. In subjects who experienced a precipice (the pit room) in wire frame had 
the same stress responses and did not report lower presence than those who 
experienced the pit in full radiosity rendering (Zimmons & Panter, 2003).  
 This framework also incorporates the idea of breaks in presence (BIP) 
(Slater & Steed, 2000). A BIP is like (a) above where aspects of the “image” 
are not in correlation with the rest of the image: e.g., a person walks into a 
wall of a Cave even though the wall should not be there according to the scene 
that is displayed in the Cave. It has been argued that incorrect correlations 
may lead to BIPs: a rose that smells like an apple would be more likely to 
cause a break in presence than a rose with no smell at all, since in the latter 
case the correlational properties of perceptual processing may lead to a “filling 
in” of the missing attribute (Harvey & Sanchez-Vives, 2005). This framework 
does incorporate the kind of perceptual “filling-in” that has been noticed 
within virtual environments, which is like (b) above. For example, a person 
will often “feel” the touch of a sharp object displayed with a virtual environ-
ment, or “feel” heat when they immerse their hand inside a red object –even 
though no tactile sensations are produced by the technology. More signifi-
cantly non-psychotic people have reported hearing voices in a virtual reality that 
depicts a social scene even though none were generated by the system –which 
happened in the study of paranoia reported in Freeman et al. (2003). 
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Necessary Conditions for Presence 
 
 In a virtual reality system there are interfaces between our sensory apparatus 
and the external world –for example, the display systems (stereo glasses, head-
mounted display) and their properties (resolution, field of view, stereo, colour 
resolution and so on) and interaction devices (the extent of head and body 
tracking), the extent to which sensory modalities are generated at all (sound, 
touch smell) and of course the rendering algorithms and interaction paradigms 
that are supported–. Each of these impose constraints on perception. Given a 
narrow visual field of view with low spatial and colour resolution it impossible 
for images to have a high correlation with those in natural vision. In other 
words the level of immersion imposes constraints on how well the perceptual 
apparatus is able to obtain images that could correlate with those of natural 
scenes. Immersion, recall, refers to the number of channels of sensory data 
generated and the degree to which the sensory data is delivered in a form that 
conforms with the capabilities and expectations of our sensory apparatus. For 
example, visual data delivered with a wide field of view, in stereo, auditory 
data delivered in surround sound according to our specific head-related trans-
fer function (HRTF) would be aspects of a high level of immersion, and so on. 
These are objectively measurable characteristics of a system that immersion 
determines the space of possible multi-sensory images. 
 The initiation of presence in a virtual or mixed-reality environment therefore 
has as a necessary condition at least two components: first the fundamental 
sensorimotor loop, the correlation between sensory data and propriopriocep-
tion as discussed above. The second is a level of immersion that permits the 
generation of images that are plausible in comparison to the probability distri-
bution over images of natural scenes, and thus can lead to responses to virtual 
sensory data as if it were real.  
 There is a third condition at a higher level of perceptual and cognitive 
processing which is more to do with the maintenance of presence over time 
rather than its initial generation. An experiment included an attempt to understand 
what happens with presence over time (Garau et al., 2008). Participants reported 
that their presence was very high on first going into the environment (a virtual bar 
scene displayed within a Cave system) and seeing solid life-sized virtual char-
acters in stereo who looked at, gestured, changed facial expressions and talked 
to them. However, over time, as it was realised that these characters did not an-
swer their questions and engaged in repetitive behaviours that did not correlate 
with the behaviour of the participants, this initial presence diminished. So 
although the “images” were sufficient to evoke an initial presence response, 
they were not sufficient in themselves to maintain this over time. 
 Thus there is a third level of correlation –between a participant’s actions 
and the reactions to this, beyond the simple perceptual level–. This is an obvious 
point but overlooked in discussions of presence, since in everyday life these 
correlations are so obvious that they are not consciously perceived. There are 
many examples, ranging across the many different levels of experience, for 
example: 
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 1. A person’s body has a shadow and it moves as they move. 
 2. A person’s body is reflected in specular surfaces. 
 3. Objects that represent sentient beings (virtual humans) should respond 
and initiate exchanges appropriately in the context of interactions –with nods, 
glances, breathing changes, forward and back movements, and so on–. 
 
 Points 1 and 2 have recently been investigated and it was found that the dis-
play of real-time shadows and reflections including those of the person’s virtual 
body significantly added to subjective presence and appropriate physiological 
response (Slater et al., 2009). In multi-person systems (where the other people 
are virtual) typically 3 is not implemented. Typically you can walk through a 
virtual character, it will not respond or try to maintain distance, it will not 
match shifts in your bodily posture, it will not synchronise breathing with you 
(often a sign of high rapport in real person-to-person communications) and so 
on. These correlations are so pervasive in everyday life that we only notice 
them through absence.  
 To summarise this section: our definition of presence is that it is successful 
combination of real sensory data and virtually generated sensory data (or in the 
case of virtual reality, replacement of real sensory data). It is successful when 
participants respond to the environment and events within it as if they were 
real. The response to be considered is multi-level: ranging from automatic 
unconscious physiological behaviours to conscious volitional actions. In be-
tween are responses that are semi-conscious, such as breathing rate, changes 
in gaze direction, shifts in body orientation and posture, and so on.  
 We argue that necessary conditions for presence are: 
 
 Condition 1. The sensory motor loop: a consistent low latency sensorimo-
tor loop between sensory data and proprioception. 
 Condition 2. Statistical plausibility: images must be statistically plausible 
in relation to the probability distribution of images over natural scenes. A con-
straint on this plausibility is the level of immersion.  
 Condition 3. Behaviour-response correlations: presence may be enhanced 
and maintained over time by appropriate correlations between the state and 
behaviour of participants and responses within the environment, correlations 
that show appropriate responses to the activity of the participants. 
 
 
Presence Measurement 
 
 Presence is a concept without valid measurement. The normal approach is 
to use questionnaires. Participants carry out some task within a virtual environ-
ment, and then after their experience they answer a questionnaire. The questions 
have ordinal scales (Slater & Usoh, 1993; Barfield & Hendrix, 1995; Witmer 
& Singer, 1998; Lessiter et al., 2001) that anchor responses between two ex-
tremes –for example 1 meaning “no presence” in the virtual environment and 7 
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meaning “complete presence”–. The earliest questionnaires were derived from 
observing and listening to subjects in debriefing interviews (Slater & Usoh, 
1993). Some later questionnaires were derived by factor analytic studies from 
earlier ones (Witmer & Singer, 1998; Lessiter et al., 2001; Schubert et al., 
2001; Witmer, 2005).  
 Questionnaire based presence assessment methods have been shown to be 
unstable in the sense that prior information can change the results (Freeman et 
al., 1999). There is also evidence to suggest that typical questionnaires cannot 
discriminate between presence in a virtual environment and physical reality 
(Usoh et al., 2000). The use of questionnaires has been challenged through the 
observation that they cannot avoid a methodological circularity –that the very 
asking of questions about “presence” may bring into being, post-hoc, the phe-
nomenon that the questionnaire is supposed to be measuring (Slater, 2004).  
 A second method for measuring presence is behavioural. If participants 
within a virtual environment behave as if they were in an equivalent real envi-
ronment then this is a sign of presence. Examples include the looming response 
(Held and Durlach, 1992), postural sway (Prothero et al., 1995; Freeman et al., 
2000), after-effects (Welch, 1997) and conflicting multi-sensory cues (Slater et 
al., 1995). These behavioural measures typically require the introduction of fea-
tures into the environment that would cause a bodily response (such as swaying 
in response to a moving visual field, or ducking in response to a flying object).  
 A particular specialisation of the behavioural approach is to use physio-
logical measures, such as those derived from ECG recordings or electrodermal 
activity. The idea in this case is that if the normal response of a person within 
physical reality to a particular situation is known and they exhibit the same 
response within a virtual environment then this is a sign of presence. The use 
of physiological measures as surrogates for presence has been attempted –but 
have been limited to situations where the physiological response is obvious 
(e.g., such as a response to a feared situation) and the results have been posi-
tive (Meehan et al., 2002)–. The drawback here is that physiological responses 
to mundane situations such as being in a virtual room which has a table and 
some chairs are not obvious. 
 Another method for measurement of presence is based on the idea of eliciting 
moments in time when breaks in presence (BIPs) occur (Slater & Steed, 2000). 
A BIP is any perceived phenomenon during the VE exposure that launches the 
participant into awareness of the real-world setting of the experience, and 
therefore “breaks” their presence in the VE. Examples include gross events 
such as bumping into a Cave wall, getting wrapped in cables, through to more 
subtle effects such as revelations that come from seeing a tree as a pixel map 
rather than a solid object. We proposed a stochastic model that allowed the 
construction of a presence measure from knowledge of moments in time when 
participants reported such BIPs. This estimator was shown to be correlated 
with traditional questionnaire measures.  
 BIPs plus physiological measures have also been combined. The concept 
is that a BIP itself can be a disturbing event that may have a physiological 
signature. We have carried out a complex experiment that explored this notion 
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with positive results (Slater et al., 2006), where deliberate BIPs were intro-
duced into a social virtual environment and physiological measures were re-
corded throughout. An analysis of a wavelet transformed representation of the 
skin conductance level could be used to successfully “predict” where the BIPs 
had occurred in the time series. Moreover a particular pattern of heart-rate 
change was observed through analysis of interbeat intervals, heart rate variability 
and power transforms of the signal. 
 
 
A Measure of Presence Against Ground Truth 
 
 Following from our view of presence as response to virtual phenomena as 
if they were real the most appropriate measurement of presence would be to 
compare actions and responses of people within a virtual environment com-
pared to their responses to similar situations in real environments. Sometimes 
there is available data on expectations of people’s behaviour –for example, the 
“pit experiment” (Usoh et al., 1999)– there was no need to actually carry out a 
physical experiment with a real pit, because people’s expected behaviour is 
well-known. The same would apply to many situations in psychotherapy. 
However, in other circumstances where data is not available, we must estab-
lish “ground truth” data for comparison, across multiple levels, of how people 
respond to virtual events compared to real events. It must be emphasised that 
this is not a “behaviourist” approach. We are interested across the board –in 
what people say, in what thoughts they report they had, how their emotions 
were effected, how their attention was distributed, in addition to observable 
behaviour, physiological responses, eye-movement patterns, brain activity and 
so on–. We do not give a higher priority to any of these, and results from these 
different levels may indeed be contradictory (e.g., people saying that they felt 
nothing but the physiological and observable behaviourable responses show 
otherwise). Moreover, this approach also includes what it is possible for partici-
pants to do, taking account of the level of immersion. Clearly if people have to 
use a wand to navigate through the virtual environment their experience is 
going to be quite different to when they can really walk. But even if they are 
flying through a fantastic landscape, presence is still an issue –the fundamen-
tal question is: do they treat what they are experiencing as if it were real?–.  
 Some recent studies have used this concept of comparison to ground 
truth. For example, Bidea and colleagues compared responses of people to ball 
throwing in real and virtual handball (Bideau et al., 2003). There has also been 
a comparison of eye scan paths in a virtual environment with what would have 
been expected in a real situation (Jordan and Slater 2009).  
 We also have carried out a detailed study of 6 subjects responding to a 
real person or virtual person walking by them, reported for the first time in 
this paper. The experiment took place in the Cave system (Cruz-Neira et al., 
1993) –specifically a Trimension ReaCTor– which has three back-projected 
vertical screens (3m×2.2m) and a floor screen (from a ceiling mounted projector) 
(3m×3m) controlled by a Silicon Graphics Onyx 2. Participants have their head 
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position and orientation tracked with an inertial/ultrasonic system (Intersense 
900). Lightweight CrystalEyes LCD shutterglasses deliver a stereo view of the 
virtual world. During the experiment first a cylinder, then a virtual character, 
and finally a real person, walked into the Cave, stopped and looked at the sub-
ject, and then carried on walking out of the Cave. The purpose here was to 
compare the physiological responses of the subject to the real person walking 
by with the physiological responses to the virtual person (and comparison of 
both with the control). The results of the experiment were surprising. Subjects 
generally reported that they found the encounters strange, and that their response 
to the virtual character was not similar (subjectively) to their response to the 
real person. However, when we look at their physiological responses a different 
story unfolds.  
 Figure 2 shows the number of Skin Conductance Responses measured for 
each subject during the appropriate time period that they encountered the cylin-
der, avatar or real person, and also a response during a baseline period when they 
were standing in the Cave and nothing was happening. It is seen in each case that 
their response to the virtual character and to the real person was closer than 
the response to the cylinder. Wilcoxon (paired) sign rank tests show that the dif-
ference in responses to the real person and virtual character were not significant, 
the response to the cylinder and baseline were also not significantly different, 
whereas all the other comparisons were significantly different. Moreover with 
repeated exposures to similar events the SCRs should decrease through to 
adaptation, but here they increase, lending further weight to these results. 
 
Figure 2: SCR Rate Per Minute for the 6 Subjects by 4 Conditions 
 
 We argue that this type of analysis is one component in a comprehensive 
approach to the measurement of presence, that requires a comparison of obser-
vable and subjective responses across multiple dimensions.  
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Conclusions 
 
 This paper has introduced a conceptual approach that we have called 
“correlational presence”. This approach is rooted in the idea of the brain as a 
correlation engine, exploiting the idea of ‘the brain’s remarkable ability to 
detect statistical correlations in sensory inputs in constructing useful percep-
tual representations of the world…’(Armel & Ramachandran, 2003). From 
this conceptual approach we have derived a notion of presence as the extent 
and capability of participants in a virtual environment to respond to virtual 
situations and events as if these were real. On this basis we argue that analysis 
of multi-level responses and actions of people within a VE provides a scien-
tific foundation for the study of presence, through the comparison of these 
responses with known or expected responses to similar situations in reality. 
This does not rule out the notion of presence in fantastic non-real situations, 
but only that in order to understand the basis of successful presence in the first 
place, comparison with expectations is an essential starting point. Once we 
begin to understand how the form in which sensory data is displayed, and the 
form of interaction necessary to maintain high presence, these same ideas can 
be applied to content that is beyond reality.  
 We have a strong belief that there is too much research in this field that is 
non-productive: recycling and comparison of questionnaires, philosophical 
discussion about the true meaning of presence, and so on. It is far more diffi-
cult and time consuming to collect detailed and comprehensive data about 
what people actually do and how they respond within VEs. The experiments 
briefly detailed above on BIPs and physiological measures, and responses to a 
virtual character took several person-years of work to carry out and complete, 
for example, and there remain masses of data that are yet to be analysed 
(Friedman et al., 2005). However, we feel that if the study of presence is to 
get off the ground and develop as a real science then this kind of detailed dif-
ficult data collection and analysis programme is essential, as complex and 
time-consuming as it may be. 
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